Intermediate Goods and Business Cycles: Implications for Productivity and Welfare by Susanto Basu
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
INTERMEDIATE GOODS AND BUSINESS
CYCLES :IMPLICATIONS
FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND WELFARE
Susanto Basu
Working Paper No. 4817




Thisis a revised version of Chapter 1 of my unpublished 1992 Harvard dissertation.Iwould like
to thank, without implicating. Larry Ball, Bob Barsky, Steve Cecchetil, Brad DeLong, John
Fernald, John Leahy, Valerie Rarney, David Romer, the members of the Harvard Macro Lunch
Group, seminar participants at various universities and the NBER, two anonymous referees, and
the editor, Ken West for helpful comments. Special thanks to my advisor, Greg Mankiw, for his
unstintinghelp, advice,and encouragement. Parts of this work were supported by fellowships
from the National Science Foundation, theChiles Foundation,theSocialSciences Research
Council, andtheNBER, whichare gratefully acknowledged.Thispaper is part of NBER's
researchprogram in MonetaryEconomics.Any opinions expressed are those of theauthorand
not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1994 by Susanto Basu. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
notice, is given to the source.NBER Working Paper #4817
August 1994
INTERMEDIATE GOODS AND BUSINESS
CYCLES :IMPLICATIONS
FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND WELFARE
ABSTRACT
This paper presents an aggregate demand-driven model of business cycles that provides
a new explanation for the procyclicality of productivity, and simultaneously predicts large welfare
losses from monetary non-neutrality. The key features of the model are an input-output
production structure, imperfect competition, counteityclical markups, and, for some results, state-
dependentprice rigidity. Truetechnical efficiency is procyclical even though production takes
placewithconstant returns, without technology shocks or technological externalities. The paper
has observableimplicationsthat distinguish it empirically from related work. These implications
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and NBERThis paper studies a business-cycle model with imperfect competition where intermediate
goods are used in production. It is an example of a class of models in which markups are
countercyclical.One major result is that in this setting,demand-driven output movements cause
productivity to be procyclical. The paper studies a number of theoretical and empirical
implications of this source of productivity fluctuations. In a subset of models1 countercyclica]
markups result from assuming that there axe fixed costs of changing nominal prices. The paper
shows that modeling the use of intermediate goods in this type of model greatly expands the
extent of price rigidity, leading to larger welfare losses from business cycles.
It is an old idea that an industrialized economy, with its greater interdependence and more
roundabout production, is more subject to cyclical output fluctuations. The idea has been present
at least since the work of Gardiner C. Means (1935). who presented evidence that different
industries had veiy different patterns of price changes versus quantity changes in the Great
Depression. Means showed that simple goods, such as agriculturai products, declined heavily in
price, while their quantity was almost unchanged. Complex manufactured goods, on the other
hand, showed the opposite pattern, with small price changes and consequently huge declines in
the quantity of sales. Crude manufactured goods fell somewhere in between. Means's suggestive
evidence has led many to speculate on the relationship between output fluctuations and
roundabout production; see, for example, Robert J. Gordon (1990).
Means was concerned with the comovement of output and prices during the Depression, but
in recent years another stylized fact of business cycles —theprocyclicality of productivity —
hasattracted greater interest. Early work on real business cycles ascribed measured fluctuations
in productivity to actual changes in production technology. However, Robert E. Hall (1988) and
Charles L. Evans (1992) have shown that productivity is contlated with variables that are
exogenous with respect to technology. Hall (1988, 1990) explains cyclical productivity as a
consequence of imperfect competition and increasing returns. Hall's explanations imply that
cyclical changes in sectoral productivity should be a function only of changes in sectoral output.
Ricardo 3. Caballero and Richard K. Lyons (1990a, 1992) document, however, that changes insectora! productivity are also correlated with aggregate output fluctuations. They interpret this
finding as evidence for technological spillovers between sectors. Ben S. Bernanke and Martin L.
Parkinson (1991), on the other hand, interpret a similar set of results for sectoral productivity
during the Depression as evidence of labor hoarding.
Here I suggest a new mechanism that explains changes in productivity over the cycle. As in
Hall (1988), the explanation relies on imperfect competition. The model differs from Hall's in
that it takes account of intermediate goods in production, and generates countercyclical markups.
Therefore the explanation for cyclical productivity is quite different from Hall's; in particular,
even withconstantreturns in production, the "cost-based Solow residual" —whichHall (1990)
shows is the right measure of total factor productivity under imperfect competition —isalso
procyclical. As a result o.f these differences, the model predicts that sectoral productivity should
in fact be correlated with aggregate activity. I show that this result implies potentially substantial
biases in Hall's estimates of the markup and the degree of returns to scale. The explanation!
propose can be distinguished empirically from those of Caballero and Lyons and Bernanke and
Parkinson. If the component of procyclical productivity thatappears as an external effect were
caused by technological externalities or cyclical factor utilization, this effect should be evident in
both gross-output and value-added data. On the other hand, if the explanation Ipropose here is
correct, external effects should appear in value-added data, but not in gross-output data.
Performing this test with data from U.S. manufacturing industries supports the model Ipresent
here. Other empirical tests also support the predictions of the model.
These are the main results of the paper when it is broadly construed as anexample of models
of countercyclical markups. The particular model!present, however, generates countercyclical
markups by assuming that firms face small costs of changing prices (menu costs) and therefore
have rigid prices over some range of shocks. In this setting, modeling firms'use of intermediate
goods in production also validates Means's conjecture. For parameter values taken from U.S.
manufacturing, the model shows that the roundabout nature of production allows sticky-price
models to explain much larger output fluctuations and more severe welfare losses than heretofore
2thought plausible.t One should note, however, that the results of the paper on productivity are
independent of whether prices are sticky, and depend only on the structure of production
combined with imperfect competition and countercyclical markups.
I model the use of intermediate goods in an input-output production structure, so all firms
use intennediate inputs in production. If price changes are costly, they are presumably costly for
all turns —includingthose producing intermediate goods —sointermediate goods should also
have rigid prices. Intennediate goods, however, act as a multiplier for price stickiness: a little
price rigidityatthe level of an individual finn leads to a large degree of economy-wide price
inflexibility.
The reason is straightforward. The representative firm is connected by a complex input-
output relationship to many other firms. But each firm cares only about the ratio of its price to its
marginal cost of production; an increase in aggregate demand induces a finn to raise its price
only to the extent that its profits are squeezed between a fixed output price and rising input costs.
With intermediate goods in production, the increase in firms' costs depends on whether other
firms raise prices. So in response to a demand shock, each firm simply "waits by the mailbox" to
see if other firms have raised their prices. If other prices go up, then the firm will also be obliged
to raise its own price. But if all firms follow this reasonable strategy, no input prices —and
hence no output prices —willincrease. In the limit as intermediate goods become the only
variable input to production, firms never change prices and output is determined solely by
aggregate demand.2
The assumption of sticky intermediate goods prices is supported by the evidence. The most
detailed analysis of nominal rigidities studied intermediate goods. George J. Stigler and James
K. Kindahl (1970) collected data on actual transaction prices for a large number of such products.
See the discussions by Laurence Ball and David Rorner (1989, 1990) of the early menu-cost models of
N. Gregory Manldw (1985) and George A. Alcerlof and Janet L. Yellen (1985).
2Thereforeintermediate goods are a real rigidity' in the sense in which the term is used by Ball and
Romer (1990). However the real rigidities that they provide as examples are all auxiliary assumptions
about the behavior of labor or product markets —e.g.efficiency wages and kinked demand curves —
whoseexistence and extent are controversial. By contrast, usage of intermediate goods is a widespread
and easily documented feature of the production process in any modem economy.
3Dennis W. Canton's (1986) analysis of this data set showed that for some substances, particularly
steel,paper, chemicals, stone, and glass products, prices can be rigid for long periods of time —
insome cases years.3 In the paper, I present evidence that intermediate goods prices are less
procyctical than labor costs. This also is consistent with my hypothesis that prices of
intennediate goods are relatively rigid.
Them is a similarity between the conclusion of this part of the paper and that of Olivier J.
Blanchard (1983), but any similarity in the models is more apparent than real. I model price
stickiness as state-dependent and the production sthicture as following an input-output
relationship, while Blanchard has time-dependent pricing and in-tine production. In Blanchard's
model, the degree of price stickiness is a function otthe number of stages of processing only
because price setting is assumed to be staggered along the chain of production. If the pricing
decision in Blanchard's model were made state-dependent then, since the "first good" is made
without intermediate goods, there would be no increase in price rigidity regardless of the number
of stages of production. In my state-dependent model, price stickiness dependsupon the use of
intermediate inputs because the input-output structure of production ensures that all firms use
intermediate goods.
Given this difference between the two models, one might ask whether production should in
fact be modeled as an input-output process, or as an irreversible chain where goodsmove in only
one direction down the stages of processing. While the "chain of production" seems plausible
primafacie, itnaturally leads one to ask whether in the real world there are empirically relevant
"first goods," the ones produced withoutany intermediate inputs. Input-output studies certainly
do not support the chain-of-production view; even the most detailedinput-output tables show
In fact, Carlton's results imply so much price rigidity that some(including Carlton) have refused to believethat thesepnces are allocative. Instead, they hold that long-term relationships between buyers and
suppliers maketheobservedspot prices a bad indicator of thetrueshadowcostof intermediate inputs. 11
this were true, however,thenthere should be a strong positive correlation betweentheobserved rigidity of
input pnces and the length of buyer-seller association. But in fact, Canton finds a negative relationship
between pncengidityand the length of association, maldngitunlikely that the "installment payment"
interpretation of price rigidity is correct
4surprisingly few zeros.4 Empirically, the biggest source of any industry's inputs is usually itself:
that is, the diagonal entries of input-output matrices are almost always thelargest elements of
each column (see Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1984). This seems to lend credenceto the view
of "roundabout rather than "in-line" production.
The paper is organized into six sections. Section I presents a simplemenu-cost model and
uses it to demonstrate that, with intermediate goods, sticky-price models can explainlarger
output fluctuations. Section II derives reasonable parameter values for the model. Section III
shows how the model broadly construed —thatis, independent of whether prices are sticky —
cangenerate procycicaj productivity movements. Section IV shows how the results derived in
the previous section affect Hall's estimates of the markup and thedegree of returns to scale.
Section V examines empirica] evidence from U.S. manufacturing and asks whetherthe evidence
is consistent with the predictions of the model. Section VI concludes.
I. The Model Narrowly Construed: Menu Costs
The model is based on Mankiw (1991). There is a continuum ofgoods, indexed on [0.1].
The representative consumer maximizes an utility function that isadditively separable in goods,
real balances, and leisure.






Qjp is the quantity of product i used for final consumption,
$isthe reciprocal of the elasticity of substitution between differentproducts (0<4) C1),
Mis money demand (assumed equal to money supply bymoney market equilibrium),
P is the general price level, and
In its discussion of the 1977 input-output table, the BEA (1984,p. 50)notesthat the table "shows heavy
interdependence among industries. Seventy-six of the [eighty-fiveJ industries shown in the tablerequired inputs of at least 40 commodities, and 52 industries required inputs of at least 50 commodities."
5L is labor supply.
Moneyis put in the utility function as a shortcut for generating money demand. I have assumed
a constant disutility of labor. Note that the assumption of additive separability makes the
quantity of any product consumed independent of the prices of all other products.
The price level. P is defined by
P= (Je.-1s]/(t-l)
Theprice level is, of course, homogeneous of degree one in all prices. The consumer maximizes
(1) subject to a standard budget constraint; the first order conditions are derived in the Appendix.
The production side of the economy is composed of a continuum of monopolistic firms, each




Lj is the labor input of firm i, and 'kiisthe quantity of the kth intermediate input used by firm i.
1 assume that all goods can serve either as final outputs or as inputs for the production of
other goods. There is, therefore, no distinction between firms producing manufactured inputs
and those producing final goods —allfirms produce for both markets. For simplicity. I also
assume that firms' elasticity of substitution between manufactured inputs in production is the
same as consumers' elasticity of substitution between goods in consumption.5 Finally, I take the
production function to be constant returns to scale and Cobb-Douglas. with the share of
nonproduced inputs (here only labor) being a.
Under these conditions, each firm's profit-maximizing nominal price, P,'. is
(3) =(') 1-4
This simplification is inessential for any of the results below. Its only purpose is to ensure that firms
face a constant elastieity of substitution demand curve for their output.
6where tisthe markup, W is the nominal wage, and k is an unimportant constant.6 The intuition
for (3) comes from the fact that the output price is set as a markup on marginal cost; since the
production function is Cobb-Douglas, marginal cost is a geometric avenge of the wage and the
overall price of intermediate goods, where the weights axe the shares of the inputs in production.
It follows from the equality of the wage and the nominal money supply shown in the
Appendix that the optimal relative price for each firm i, pj, is
(4) =
Theimportant point to note about (4) is that the optimal relative price depends upon real
balances raised to the power a, rather than to the power I as in the simple menu cost model of
Mankiw (1991). Therefore the change in the optimal price following a monetary shock is a
times the percentage change in money. Depending on the value of a, this can substantially
reduce the loss to a firm that does not adjust its price after a monetary shock, relative to the case
where the use of intermediate goods is not modeled. The intuition is straightforward. Aggregate
demand is proportional to real money balances, so with fixed prices an increase in money raises
output and the demand for labor. Workers are always on their labor supply curves, so the
increased use of labor raises the real wage. Since firms set their optimal relative price as a
markup on real marginal cost, the increase in the real wage raises the optimal price. But if
intermediate goods are used in production, firms' marginal costs rise only in proportion to labor's
share, a, since intermediate goods prices are fixed.
As Manldw (1985) and Alcerlof and Yellen (1985) point out, the loss to a monopolistic firm
of not changing its price in response to a money shock is of second order in the change in the
optimal price. For price stickiness to be a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that the loss to
each firm of not adjusting prices, assuming that no other firm adjusts, is less than the menu cost
of changing prices. Each firm calculates the private cost of leaving prices unchanged under the
6Seethe Appendix for details.
7Nash assumption that all other prices will remain at their current levels. The calculations
performed in this section show how this private cost of price rigidity varies as a function of the
importance of intermediate goods in production.
To a second order approximation, the change in profit to a firm from not adjusting its price
in response to a monetary shock is given by
(5) r.(p*) — ir(p* jf'(p*) (p*_. p*f
whereC is the second derivative of the profit function with respect to prices. The difference
beween P',,wandPoidisof course proportional to the change in real balances.
We wish to see how the profit loss (5) varies with respect to a, the share of labor in total
cost. As far as the change in the firm's optimal relative price is concerned, this is not difficult.
From the discussion above, it is clear that the change is proportional to a. If the loss were based
solely on the square of the change in the optimal price, it would diminish strictly in proportion to
a2. However, there axe also the changes in the C term to be considered. Unfortunately, the
expression for the derivative of C with respect to a is positive. The two effects work against
each other, so it is not possible to sign the derivative unambiguously. Therefore I present
numerical evaluations of (5) for different values of a.
The numerical results are reported in Table 1. Table 1 gives the loss to a firm of not
adjusting its price in response to a 1 percent money shock as a function of a. The loss is
expressed as a fraction of firm profits. To facilitate comparison, the losses are normalized so that
the profit loss in the base case (a =l)is1. Thus each entry in Table I report-s the quantity
(6) (*..j)/*
[(fl*)f*] Ictl
where starred variables reflect optimal values and the denominator is always evaluated at a =1.
Firms' losses diminish significantly as a decreases. The results of Table I conform to
expectation: profit losses fall by approximately a factor of a2. The loss is not precisely a2
because the Ctermalso changes with a. This second effect is insignificant, however, showing
8up in the fourth decimal place if at all. (The other important parameter, the elasticity of demand
Q,justchanges the equilibrium levels of output and profits. Variations in do not affect the loss
once it is normalized by the loss in the base case of no intermediate goods, where a =1.)
If we assume that the firm is indifferent between changing its price and leaving it constant
for a one percent money shock at a =1,what is the percent change in money required to leave it
similarly indifferent for Lower values of a? Since losses are basically proportional to the square
of the money shock, the required money shock is given by the square root of the inverse of each
entry in Table 1. Looking at the line for a =0.9.it is interesting to note that even with low use of
intermediate goods in production, the allowable money shock jumps by more than 10 percent.
In the next section I suggest reasonable ranges for a and t, given the share of intermediate
inputs in revenue and econometric estimates of the markup. I show that the introduction of
intermediate goods with sticky prices into a menu cost model is quantitatively important.
These results follow logically from the assumption of sticky intermediate (and final) goods
prices. One might ask, however, whether this assumption is a reasonable description of the
world: just how cyclical are the costs of intermediate inputs, particularly relative to the cost of
labor? Before answering the question it is necessary to dispel a common misconception. One
typically thinks of intermediate inputs as "materials" —raw commodities whose prices are
known to be volatile and procyclical.7 But raw materials and energy are actually only a small
fraction of total intermediate input. In a modem economy, by far the largest share of these inputs
is devoted to purchases of goods manufactured by other firms. This paper takes the same view as
the National Income Accounts: intermediate goods are properly distinguished by use, not by type
of good. Once one takes the correct input-output view of intermediate inputs, it is easy to believe
that intermediate goods have relatively rigid prices. At the least, the assumption of rigid
materials prices is no less reasonable than the assumption of rigid final goods prices: in many
This confusion results in large part from terminology. In the production function literature. inputs are
classified as KLEM —capital,labor, energy, and materials. That literature takes the correct view of
"materials" as all intermediate goods and services, but the word is confusing in this context because it
leads one to naturally —butincorrectly —identify"materials" with unprocessed commodities.
9cases, materials arefinalgoods.8 Understanding the correct definition of intermediate inputs
helps understand why Stigler and Kindahl (1970) found that intermediate goods prices were rigid
for long periods of time. In Section V. I present evidence showing that intermediate goods prices
are less procyclicalthanlabor costs. This is further evidence in support of my hypothesis that
prices of intermediate goods are relatively rigid.
II. Choosing Reasonable Parameter Values.
How can the model be calibrated to judge what are reasonable values of a? In their
examination of gross output in U.S. manufacturing, Dale W. Jorgenson. Frank M. Gollop, and
Barbara M. Fraumeni (1987) find that the share of intermediate inputs in total manufacturing
output is 50 percent or greater over the period 1947-1979. So a value of 0.50 seems
conservative.
To use the figure cited above, we must derive a relationship between the revenue share of
materials and a. The share of intermediate goods in total revenue is (I -Qr/Q). whereQpisfinal
production (orvalue added), andQistotal (gross) output. Using the equations in the Appendix,
we obtain
(7) (1-a) =
Thisequation defines a negative relationship between a and the markup. That, combined with
the restriction that a must be between zero and one, defines arange of possible values. So the
upper bound for a is 0.5 —thiscorresponds to the case where price equals marginal cost —but
with markups the true a will be smaller. The intuition for theappearance of the markup in the
expression for the share of intermediate goods comes from the fact that the economy is
imperfectly competitive. Since the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the share of
One commonly hears the claim that Blanchaid (1983) and Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shlcifer, and
Robert W. Vishny (1989) have shown that intermediate input prices are more procyclical than final goods
pnces. Their conclusions result from incorrectly equating intermediate goods with unprocessed goods.
I0intermediate goods in total costis(1-a). But in an economy with monopolistic competition, the
cost share equals the revenue share multiplied by the markup. To calculate the cost share from
the observable revenue sham, we must take a position on the size of the markup.
The right concept of the markup for this paper is the ratio of the price ofgross output (not
real value added)to itsmarginal cost of production. As Ian Domowitz. R. Glenn Hubbard, and
Bruce C. Petersen (1988) note, if materials are used in production then themarkup estimated
from value added exceeds the true markup because it divides profits bya smaller denominator
(value added rather than gross output). I argue below that estimating the markup usinggross-
output data also avoid other biases of value-added data. Using gross-output data, Domowitz et.
a!. estimate an average markup of 1.6 for the industries in their sample. This allowsus to pin
down the relevant value of a.
Table 2 gives a range of values for a, with corresponding implied values ofp.. Each column
is computed for a different value of a. The table reports the markupscorresponding to these
values of a, given the observed revenue share of materials of 0.5. The next line of the tablegives
the profit loss from price stickiness for a one percentmoney shock, normalized as before so that
it is a fraction of the profit loss for a =1.
Given an estimated markup of 1.6. the relevant columns of Table 2 are the lasttwo on the
right, corresponding to p.=l.5 and j.t=1.7. These show profit losses to firms declining bya factor
of 25 to 100. What art the consequences for business cycles? The size of the maximumshock to
money for which non-adjustment is a Nash equilibrium jumps five- to 10-fold, implying larger
output fluctuations from sticky prices. Thus, once we recognize the role of intermediate goods in
production, menu-cost models can explain significantly larger business cycles.
The welfare consequences are also immediate. Ball and Romer (1989, 1990) summarize
welfare by examining the ratio, R, of the social cost of output fluctuations to the privatecost.
Since, in this model, the social cost of fluctuations comes solely from the disutility of variance in
consumption, it is unaffected by introducing intermediate goods. But as I have shown, for
plausible parameter values the private cost of business cycles falls considerably. Therefore R
11increases by a factor of 25w 100, so menu-cost models can also explain inefficient business
cycles.
But are the calibrated parameter values reasonable? One might argue that if the markup is as
high as 1.6, the share of profits in output becomes implausibly large. The most natural way to
reconcile high markups with low observed profits is to suppose that there are large fixed costs of
production. In this view, output in excess of variable cost is largely consumed by fixed costs.9
The production function of equation (2) can easily be amended to allow for fixed costs, without
any change in the preceding analysis. With fixed costs, however, the interpretation of a changes:
ci is no longer the share of labor in total cost, but the share of variable labor in total variable cost.
This is important to keep in mind, because! have argued that a is in the range of 0.2 to 0.1. But
the share of non-produced inputs (capital and labor) in total cost is roughly 0.5. With overhead
labor and capital, however, these different figures are not contradictory: it is perfectly possible
for the share of variable labor and capital to be small, while their total share (inclusive of fixed
costs) is large.
ill. The Model Broadly Construed: Countercyclical Markups
This section shows that a business cycle model with constant returns in production, no
technological externalities, and no technology shocks can account for one of the major stylized
facts of business cycles, procyclical labor and total factor productivity. As noted in the
introduction, the result of procyclical productivity and its consequences, which are explored in
the following sections, would obtain in any model with intermediate goods and countercyclical
markups. Price rigidity is one way of generating countercyclical markups, but other explanations
—suchas the customer-market model of Edmund S. Phelps and Sidney G. Winter (1970). or the
supergame-theoretic model of Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner (1986)— would serve
equally well. Thus, the results of this section and the following ones apply to a much broader
This is the view of Hall (1986), and is true in Chambeilinian inonopolistically competitive equilibrium.
12class of models than the one considered in Section I, and constitute an interesting mechanism for
the transmission of shocks in purely real models of countercyclicai markups suchas Rotemberg
and Michael Woodford (1991).
The result of procyclical productivity is driven by three properties of the model. First, since
firms are imperfectly competitive —pricesare above marginal costs —theequilibrium is
inefficient. Second, the inefficiency is lower at higher levels of output: the model has the feature
that markups are countereyclical. Third, intermediate goods axe used in production. Blanchard
and NobuhiroKiyotaki(1987) present a model that has the first and second features, but not the
third. In their model, the presence of markup pricing distorts the labor-leisure choice butnot
producers' decisions about the mix of inputs to employ: since they assume that labor is the only
input to production, there is no "input mix" to distort. Thus, even though higher levels ofoutput
raise welfare in their model, this increase in welfare does not raise productivity. But when
manufactured inputs are used in production, markup pricing also makes firms' production
decisions socially suboptimal. In particular, at the initial equilibrium firms use too much of the
primary input, labor, and too few manufactured inputs. Inthismodel, the decrease in markups
that accompanies output movements causes the ratio of input prices to be closer to themarginal
rate of transformation between goods and labor. Thus, firms making their input choices make
decisions about the quantity of labor to employ versus the quantity of manufacturedinputs to use
that are closer to being socially optimal. This increase in social efficiency notonly increases
welfare, it also raises productivity. So in this model there are endogenous variations in
productive efficiency, caused by the fact that the economy is moving closer to the boundary of its
production possibilities frontier during a boom and farther away during a recession.
So far the discussion of the paper has used gross output as theconcept of production.
However, gross output is the total output of a firm, including the output used by other firms as
intermediate goods. But the efficiency of an economy is judged by its ability to produce final
goods from a given quantity of non-produced inputs (here only labor). So the correct statistic to
examine is value added relative to labor, rather than gross output relative to labor.
13To examine the issue of cyclical productivity,we firstderivetheeconomy-wide (and
sectoral) value-added production function. Since labor is the only input to production and there
are constant returns to scale, we can represent the net output or value-added production function
as
(8) QpAL
where A is this economy's"totalfactorproductivity."
We wish to examine the change in productivity as a function of the change in value added,
assuming that menu costs are large enough to prevent prices from changing in response to the
money shock that causes the output expansion. Alternatively, one can view the output movement
as an expansion of real aggregate demand in a flexible-price model where, for any of the reasons
given in the models citedabove. a one percent increase in final output is accompanied by an
percent reduction in the markup.
The percent change in A is derived from this experiment. Taking the appropriate derivatives
and evaluating the resulting expression at the real wage that prevails at the initial equilibrium
yields:
9 dA (41(1a)(pi)'\dQp =
a+(-1))W•
Thisexpression ispositive and rises monotonically as a falls. It shows why imperfect
competitionisnecessary for the result: if p =l,so that there are no distortions in production,
productivity is not procyclical. Of course, if a = I them are no intermediate goods and
productivity is again acyclical: this is the special case of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Note
that the result is not being driven by Hall's (1988) argument that the Solow residual is procyclical
if there are markups. In my model economy, dAtA is the correct measure of the change in
productive efficiency; in Hall's terminology it is the "cost-based Solow residual." Hall (1990)
claims that this cost-based residual should be invariant even with markup pricing, unless firms
have increasing returns to scale. Here I present a counterexample: in this model all firms
14produce with constant returns to scale, but the cost-based residual is procyclical. The intuition
for this result, and its consequences for Hall's tests, are discussed below.
Values for the coefficient in (9) are reported in Table 3 for settings of a and g that satisfy
calibration. The table shows that productivity changes are higher if a is lower. Thus, as one
would expect, changes in total factor productivity are larger as intermediate goods become more
important in production. For the U.S. over the period 1962-84. a one percent growth in output
resulting from a demand shock is associated with a 0.59percentgrowth in total factor
productivity(Rotembergand Lawrence Summers, 1990, Table 11). For markups around 1.6, the
model as calibrated would predict a growth in total factor productivityofbetween 0.20percent
and 0.33percent in responseto a one percent increase in output. So for some empirically
reasonable parameter values, the model is capableofaccounting for a significant proportion of
demand-induced changes in total factor productivity.
A striking feature of this model is that it predicts a positive correlation between sectoral
productivity and aggregate activity. The increase in productivity comes from the fact that each
industry is making more efficient choices about the mix of factors to employ in production.10
Given the assumption that each industry uses as intermediate goods mostly the outputs of other
industries, the increase in efficiency depends on an across-the-board reduction in markups. A
uniform reduction in the markup for all varieties of intermediate goods will be correlated with
changes in aggregate activity, but not with industry-specific changes in output. Caballero and
Lyons (1990a, 1992) present empirical evidence that sectoral productivity is in fact correlated
with demand-driven changes in aggregate output in both European and U.S. manufacturing.11
The model provides an economic explanation of their finding.
10 Here is another point where taking the correct, broad, view of intermediate inputs provides better
intuition. By using a Cobb-Douglas production function, I have assumed that the elasticity of substitution
between labor and intennediate goods is one. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) use econometric
estimates and an imperfectly competitive general equilibrium model to calibrate this elasticity equal to 1.2 —greaterthan the Cobb-Douglas case. These relatively large elasticities of substitution are not
surprising when one recalls that intermediate inputs include inputs of services, which are an increasingly
large share of total inputs. The elasticity of substitution between using, for example, an in- house
computer technician and an outside repairman is surely very high.
1 Their use of aggregate demand instruments ensures that the results are not being driven by common or
sectoral productivity shocks, as in the model of John B. Long and Charles I. Plosser (1983).
15This explanation of the Caballero-Lyonsstylizedfact does not assume that there are true
technological spillovers operating at business-cycle frequencies. Not only is it difficult to model
such externalities, it is difficult even to tell an intuitive story for what form they might take. The
advantage of this model is that it does not rely on high-frequency shifts in the production
function, but rather on cyclical changes in the relative price of inputs to production.
Consequently, the model delivers a sharp prediction about how we can distinguish between
these two explanations for the Caballero-Lyons findings. It predicts that such an effect should be
found when a production function is estimated with value-added data, but not withgross-output
data. Estimating the gross-output production function amounts to estimating equation (2). By
assumption, there axe no technological externalities in the production of gross output, so correct
estimation of (2) will reveal none. But each productive unit becomes more efficient atcreating
value-added because the markup is smaller. This increase in efficiency is correlated with
increases in aggregate output. This distinction between the two explanations is testable; it is
examined in Section v.'2
IV. Implications for Hall's Tests
In a series of papers, Halt (1986, 1988, 1990) has proposed various ingenious methods of
using time series data on productivity to determine the markup of price over marginal cost and
the degree of returns to scale. One implication of the previous discussion is that ifintermediate
goods are used in production and markups are countercyclicaj,many of Hall's esti mates are likely
to be biased upward.
Intuitively, Hall's tests assume that tnie productivity (as measured by the cost-based Solow
residual) can be procycicaJ for only two reasons: technology shocks and increasing returnsto
scale. I have shown in the previous section that productivitycan be procyclical for a third
12 This predicted differencewill also hold if the Cabaflero-Lyos results in fact stem from cyclical factor
uLilization. A change in utilization is a shift of thegross-output production function, and will show up as
such in gross-output data as well as in value-added data.
16reason: even with constant returns to scale, productivity increases if a demand-driven expansion
causes markups to fall.In econometricterms, there isasecond error term inHall's regressions
that is correlated with his right-hand-side variables and withhis aggregatedemand instruments.
Thissecond errorterm isthe source of the bias.
It is easy to show that in this model economycharacterized by imperfect competition,
constant returns, and markup pricing —just what HaIl (1988) assumes —Hall'smethodology
leadsto a systematic upward bias in the estimate ofthe markup. Hall estimates a relationship
like
(10) (AlnQF)= jf(aAlnL),
wherea isthe shareoflabor in value added andI isclaimed to be anunbiasedestimate of the
markup.13
Inthe model developedhere,however,AInOF= MnA+AInL.If AmA didnotcomove with
outputor labor input — or were unconelated with demand-driven changes in labor input,which
wouldhappen if AmA were a pure technology shock — the expectation of the estimated markup
would be
(11)E(j.tIAlnA=0)=cov(AlnQp,aAlnL)= WIA= E gVA
var(aAlnL) a l-(l-cx)
Even withoutconsidering the problemsposed by thecorrelationof AlnA with changes in labor
input, we see that the expectation of g is not equal to the true j.t.Thisis because Hall estimates
the markup on real value added rather than the markup on output.14 But given an unbiased
estimate of gVA, it is relatively easy to back out the true i,sincethe relation between the two
depends only on the observable share of intermediate goodsinrevenue. So if changesintrue
sectoralproductivity (AInA) are uncorrelated with aggregate demand instruments, Hall's
Hall's proceduretreatsboth capital and labor as inputs into the production of value added. The model
aggregates both (actors into a singlenon-produced input,termed "laboC in honor of its primary
component I do not explicitly model Hall's instrumental variables estimation, because by hypothesis
there art no true technology shocks in the model. Hall's IV procedure was designed to purge the
explanatory variable of its correlation with technologyshocks;using aggregate demand instnJments would
not solve the problem I identify,sincein my model productivitychangeswith aggregate demand.
Hall is clearly aware of this aspectofthe value-added/gross-output distinction; see Hall (1986).
17methodology at least gives an unbiased estimate of 11VA,fromwhich we can calculate the true
markup, j.t.
But as shown in (9), changes the level of productivity covary systematically and positively
with changes in QpandL. Therefore, if one takes into account the fact that zMnA changes
predictably in response to demand shocks, Hall's methodology creates an upward bias even in the
estimate of 1.LVA in this economy. The size of the bias can be computed from the equation for the
true expectation of rL':
(13) E4t)=cov(AlnL+álnA,cAlnL)= +cov(AlnA,1nL)
var (ciAlnL) var(AInL)
Evidently the bias is a positive one (since productivity comoves positively with labor input).
Calculations of the size of this bias for the calibrated parameter values are given in Table 4.
Over the relevant range of parameters (true gross-output markups around 1.6), the upward bias is
between 25 and 50percent.
Hall's 1990 paper tested the invariance of the cost-based Solow residual at both the
economy-wide and two-digit SIC levels. In this model, Hall's estimating equation would be:
(14) AlnQp =7(GcAlnL).
where a is the share of labor in the total cost of producing value added (here flxed at 1) and y is
Hall's estimate of the degree of returns to scale. For the reasons given above and in the previous
section, this methodology would wrongly conclude that firms had increasing returns to scale
(y> I), when in fact the truey is identically equal to I. The percentage biases would be those
given in Table 4. An easy way to test the hypothesis that Hall's estimate of y is biased up is to
estimate (14) using gross-output data —whichshould not be subject to this bias —andcontrast
the results with Hall's value-added estimates. Below I present evidence indicating that.Hall 's
estimates are in fact subject to precisely this bias. The gross-output estimates imply returns to
scale that are about constant (or slightly decreasing) —asharp contrast with Hall's fird!ng of
strongly increasing returns, and evidence in favor of this model.
18The reason for the bias is the confusion of external effects with internal increasing returns to
scale. In the model considered here, all firms produce with constant returns, but an aggregate
demand shock increases both output and productivity. Thus, an increase in the output of every
firm is correlated with an increase in the economy-wide efficiency of production —anexternal
effect that Hall's procedure mistakes for increasing returns to scale at the firm level.
V. Some Empirical Evidence
The model has two types of empirical implications. First, it predicts cyclical movements of
some ratios that are not often studied in business cycle theory. For example, it implies that the
prices of intermediate goods should be countercyclical relative to the price of labor. Also, the
quantities of intermediate goods used should be procyclical, again relative to labor input.
More direct tests of the model examine its predictions regarding the substitution of materials
for labor and the behavior of total factor productivity.15 First, the model predicts that there
should be a positive correlation between changes in the materials-output ratio and changes in the
ratio of wages to the price of intermediate inputs (since the increased use of materials results
from a change in the relative price of inputs). Second. if the change in the relative price has the
effect claimed in the paper, then there should also be a positive correlation between procyclical
total factor productivity and procyclical usage of materials relative to labor. The most novel
prediction of the paper is the third effect: as discussed above, estimates of external effects using
value-added data should be significant, but similar estimates using gross-output data should be
insignificant.
In this section, I check these predictions against U.S. time series data. The data generally
support the predictions of the model.
Dale Jorgenson kindly supplied the data I use, which are thoroughly described in Jorgenson,
Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987). A major improvements of this data set relative to standard NIPA
15 would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the first two tests.
19data is that all the inputs are quality-adjusted. The labor input series, for example, is a quality-
weighted index of hours worked by different categories of workers, rather than the usual measure
of the sum of horns worked by all workers whichimplicitlyassigns equal weight to all workers.
The data set employs gross production as the relevant concept of output, and therefore
reports quantities used of capital, labor, energy, and materials. The Jorgenson data set is
especially suitable because the mode! makes predictions about materials usage over the business
cycle. I have modified the materials series to reflect usage per year rather than purchases. But
although work in process and intermediate goods inventories are strongly procyclical, as Valerie
A. Rainey (1989) documents, the results are not sensitive to this modification (inventories are
small relative to total intermediate input use).
The data used for the tests are a pane! of annual observations on 21 manufacturing industries
in the U.S. from 1959 to 1984. The definitions of the industries are standard two-digit S.l.C.,
with the exception that the Jorgenson data set separates Motor Vehicles (S.I.C. 371) from other
transportation equipment (S.I.C. 372-79). Thus, there are 21 industries rather than the usual 20.
All of the regressions involve testing for cyclical effects. To avoid the possibility that the
cyclicality of both output and, say, the price of materials relative to labor are driven by
technology shocks that make materials usage more attractive in a boom. I typically instrument
the right hand side variables. The instruments axe those suggested by Ramey (1989): the change
in the world price of oil, changes in military expenditures, and the political party of the president.
A. Cyclical Regularities
As noted above, one of the predictions of the predictioniof the model is that materials prices
are countercyclical, relative to the prices of substitutes such as labor and capital.16 This
16Theusual claim that the observed wage is less procyclical than the shadowwage strengthens the
results of this section. if the true marginal wage is more procyclical than it seems —perhapsbecause of
overtime payments, as stressed by Mark Bils (1987)— then the relative price of materials is even more
countercychcal than I find.
20prediction is testedusingthe Jorgenson data. I estimate the following equation (where all
variablesare in logs):
(APmit- aPut)=constant1+ B1 aY1 (15)
Pmjand Pu arethe prices of intermediate goods and labor inputs toa given industry i;Y1 is
sectoral output.
Table 5 reports the estimate of B1 (with the elasticity constrained to be equalacross
industries). The elasticity is negative and significant, as the model predicts.17
This result, that one measure of the real wage is significantly procyclical,may seem at odds
with the conventional wisdom that the real wage is acyclical or only slightly procyclicaJ. The
cost of labor input is more procyclical in the Jorgenson data set because labor quality is
significantly countercyclical.18 A slightly higher real wage paid to lower quality workers implies
that the cost alan efficiency unit of labor is much higher in booms. So in an expansion labor
become more expensive relative to intermediate inputs, which must lead producers to economize
on labor and use intermediate goods more intensively.
The next prediction I check is the claim that materials usage is procyclical relative to labor.
The basic equation I estimate is:
(AM- aLj) =constant1+ 82 AYj (16)
where M1 and L1 are (the log of) intermediate goods and labor inputs. Table 5 gives the estimate
of B2 for U.S. manufacturing. The elasticity is positive and significant.
One might believe, however, that the result of procyclical intermediate goodsusage is being
driven by labor hoarding. Estimates of production functions and the degree of returns to scale
are often thought to be subject to cyclical measurement error. In this view, the apparent
acyclicality of labor hours may stem from unmeasured procyclical work effort. If so, true labor
"Labor" as used in this model, comprises both capital and labor inputs; "materials"may or may not
include energy. In the empirical work I have used the standard definition of labor and aconcept of
materials that excludes energy (which anyway is only about 5 patent of a typical sector's materials input).
Excluding energy shows that the results are not being driven by the oil price shocks of the 70s. However.
the findings are robust to using all combinations of these different concepts; the results are often
strengthened by using broader definitions of labor and "materials?
1 Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott (1988) andGaiy Solon, Robert Barsky, and Jonathan A.
Parker (1994) show that this composition effect is important for analyzing realwage cyclicality.
21input will be procydical even if measured hours are not If this effect is not taken into account,
one might wrongly conclude that the ratio of intermediate goods to labor is procyclical.
One way to control for labor hoarding is to include right-hand-side variables that are
plausible proxies for cyclical labor utilization. One such variable, average hours worked per
employee (AGH), has been proposed by Thomas A. Abbott, Zvi Griliches, and Jerry A. Hausman
(1989). Following Caballero and Lyons (1992), I also use two other variables to control for labor
hoarding: the ratio of production to non-production workers (PNP), and the average number of
overtime hours worked (OVT).
The results are found in Table 5. They confirm the hypothesis of labor hoarding: the
variables that control for changes in effective labor input always have the correct sign and are
usually significant. As expected, taking labor hoarding into account reduces 2.Buteven
accounting for labor hoarding, intermediate input usage remains strongly procyclical relative to
labor.
Another way to see if labor hoarding is responsible for the results is to examine the
cyclicality of the ratio of intermediate inputs to industry output. In fact, this test is biased against
finding procyclicality. Changes in both industry and aggregate output are likely to be driven by
common productivity shocks and oil price shocks, imparting a negative bias to the results. For
this reason, I do not instrument the explanatory variable, changes in aggregate output. Almost all
of the explanatory power of the instruments used previously comes from oil prices. But using oil
prices as an instrument would only exacerbate the bias, by isolating those changes in aggregate
output that are most strongly correlated with the error term.
The results are also reported Table 5.Theratio of intermediate inputs to output is
procyclical and statistically significant. The numerical magnitudes are smaller, but this is not
surprising, given the negative bias in the results noted above. These results should be thought of
as a lower bound on the procyclicality of intermediate goods usage; it is apparent that even the
lower bound is positive. The existence of labor hoarding does not after this basic finding.
22B. Specific Predictions
In this section I test the more specific predictions of the model.
First, I test whether changes in the intermediate goods-output ratio are consistently related to
changesin the relativeprice of these inputs. To test the prediction, I run the regression
(aM1- AY1J =constant1+83(APu -M'm.iO (17)
The result is found in the last line of Table 5;83is positive and significant. Note that if the
production function is in fact Cobb-Douglas, the estimated coefficient in this regression should
be a. The coefficient is 0.12, which is in line with the calibrated value of cx based on evidence
regarding the size of the markup, a was predicted to be between 0.2 and 0.1.
Next I test the prediction that changes in the input mix are responsible for changes in total
factor productivity. Here, however, there is the problem with labor hoarding discussed above. If
there is a significant degree of unmeasured factor utilization that applies to labor but not to
intermediate goods, the measured pmcycicality of total factor productivity and of the
intermediate goods-labor ratio may both be driven by cyclical measurement error. There is a
way to distinguish these two hypotheses, however. To the extent that cyclical measurement error
is driving the finding of procyclical productivity, this effect should be apparent in both gross-
output and value-added data. However, as argued above, the procyclicality resulting from
countercyclical markups should be found only in value added. This suggests that we should
regress two different measures of the Solow residual on changes in the materials-labor ratio —
onemeasure calculated from gross output and the other from value added. If the value-added
estimate is significantly larger, this will imply that the mechanism identified in the paper is at
work. So I estimate
ATFPh =constant1+84(M41-b14J (18)
23In calculating the growth rate of total factor productivity, I use cost shares19 rather than
revenue shares to avoid the problem pointed out by Hall (1988): productivity calculated using
revenue shares appears spuriously procyclical if firms price their product above marginal cost. I
do not allow for increasing returns in production, which Hall (1990)argues is responsible for the
failure of invariance in the cost-based Solow residual. Recent empirical work by Martin N.
Baily, Charles Hulten, and David Campbell (1992) applies Hall's procedure to plant-level gross-
output data from the Longitudinal Research Database and finds essentially constant returns to
scale. In the next series of tests, I come to the same conclusion using industry-levelgross-output
data.
The results of the test using total factor productivity are reported in Table 6. Note first that
there is evidence of signiflcant procyclicality of the gross-output residual (ATFPGO) inresponse
to changes in the materials-labor ratio. Therefore, as indicated above, part of the movement in
this ratio most likely reflects changes in unmeasured labor utilization. However, it is also clear
that the value-added estimate significantly exceeds —byalmost a factor of three —thegross-
output estimate. Therefore, although it appears that some of the correlation between total factor
productivity and changes in the materials-labor ratio reflect labor hoarding, the datasupport the
contention that some other mechanism like the one proposed here is also at work.
Finally, I test the prediction that if the mechanism proposed by the model is responsible for
the finding that procycical productivity is an external effect,we should be able to detect the
effect in value-added data but not in gross-output data.20 Theempirical procedure follows
Caballero and Lyons (1989). I estimate the equation:
=constant1+ yAX1 + KaX, (19)
19 The cost sharesare calculated as in Hall (1990). However, I use capital-specific depreciation rates arid
tax parameters (the investment tax credit and the value of depreciation allowances) thatvary by industry. 20 Susanto Basu and John 0.Fernald (1993, 1994) propose a different explanation for why value-added
data should give incorrect estimates of returns to scale and external effects.Their explanation basically
rests on the correct claim that with imperfect competition, value added should be calculatedusing the cost
share of materials rather than the revenue share. (For the definition ofvalue added, see Kenneth J. Arrow
(1974),) To meet this objection, I used cost shares to construct the value-added data that Iuse in equation
(19). As the results show, even with this correction there are external effects in valueadded and none in
gross output, as the model predicts.
24where ax1 is the cost share-weighted sum of sectors] input growths, and ax is growth of
aggregate (manufacturing) inputs, similarly cost-weighted. isthe growth of value added;
AY100is the growth of gross output. In the value-added regressions, the inputs are capital and
labor; in the gross-output regressions the inputs are capital, labor, energy, and materials. Value
added is constructed using the cost share of materials. 7 is the degree of internal returns to scale;
Kcapturesexternal effects from aggregate activity. (See Caballero and Lyons (1989) for a fuller
description of the procedure.)
There is a significant difference between the value-added and gross-output estimates. Table
6 shows that in the gross-output regressions the point estimate of Kis0.0] —closeto zero, and
not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the value-added estimate is 0,80, witha
t-statisticthat exceeds 9. This finding is significant for interpreting the Caballero-Lyons stylized
fact. The difference between the two sets of results indicates that their finding of a large positive
Kisnot evidence for a true technological externality, but rather an indication that a more subtle
effect, perhaps having to do with cyclical changes in markups, is at work. Note that the estimate
of y, the degree of internal returns to scale, is essentially 1 in the gross-output data, implying that
there are constant returns to scale. This finding contrasts with the results of Hall (1990). who
finds significantly increasing returns using value-added data. As the previous section shows, the
model presented here can explain this divergence.
This simple model therefore has a number of predictions about cyclical patterns of input use,
input prices, and the behavior of productivity over the business cycle. Data from U.S.
manufacturing industries generally confirm these predictions.
VI. Conclusion
A wide variety of evidence indicates that modern economies are characterized by
imperfectly competitive behavior, and many business-cycle models of imperfect competition
imply countercydlical markups. Intermediate goods are widely used in production. This paper
25has explored the implications of these two sets of stylized facts, and finds that in conjunction
they lead to a number of strong results. In purely real models they implythat productivity, even
correctly measured, is procyclical in response to demand shocks1 even with constant returns to
scale in production and no technological externalities. In models where countercyclical markups
are a consequence of output price rigidity, modeling the use ofintermediate goods in production
implies that business cycles are both larger and more costly.
The model makes a number of predictions about cyclical productivity that accord with the
facts. Among other things, it predicts that sectoral productivity should appear in the data as an
external effect: the productivity of one sector should be correlated with aggregate rather than
sectoral activity. The model also implies that Hall's estimates of markups and returns to scale are
biased up. Other authors have interpreted the finding of external effects in productivity as
evidence for technological spillovers or for labor hoarding. I show that there is a sharp empirical
test that can discriminate among these various hypotheses. If the type of model presented here is
responsible for the finding of external effects, these effects should be present in value-added data
but not in gross-output data. If the spillover or labor hoarding hypotheses are at work, on the
other hand, then they should be present in both gross output and value added. It turns out that the
spillovers are found only in value added, which confirms the predictions of the model. The paper
predicts that the biases in Hall's work should also be a function of his use of value-added data.
Using Hall's procedure to estimate returns to scale from gross-output data shows that there are
constant returns, not the strongly increasing returns that Hall finds. This finding also supports a
model of the kind presented here, with countercyclical markups and intermediate goods in
production.
It is important to stress that although price rigidity is not necessary to derive the results on
cyclical productivity, these results do follow naturally from a sticky-price model. Thus, a setting
in which the menu-cost assumption easily explains large welfare losses —amodel with
imperfect competition and heavy usage of intermediate goods —alsoenables these models to
explain many of the stylized facts on cyclical productivity. This paper, then, provides a link
26between the purelyreal and purelynominal litentures within the New Keynesianeconomics.
This link should be a subject of futureresearch.
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31Appendix: Derivations





Minimizingcosts subject to the production function (2) gives the input demands for each
firm:
(A3) 'ki =(!jl/(laW IPi
'=(j&






The total output of each firm, Q,isgiven by the sum of demands for its output as final
goods (equation A2) and as intermediate inputs (the integral of (A3) over I). This gives
(A6) =




where Q = diis aggregate (gross) output. One can solve for the equilibrium aggregates QF
and Qfrom(A2)and(A6), using the fact that all firms' quantities and prices are equal in this
symmetricequilibrium.
32Table 1. Losses from a One Percent Money Shock
(as percent of profit)
a=1 a=0.9 a=0.7 a=0.5 a=0.3 a=0.1
1.000 0.8102 0.4901 0.2500 0.0900 0.0100
Note:Entries give numerical evaluations of equation (6), where (it- it) isdefined in equation
(5).
33Table 2. Losses fromaOne Percent Money Shock for Calibrated Parameter Values
cc=0.45ct=0.4a=0.3a=0.2 a=0.1
hnpIiedM&kup±a 1.042 1.137 1.327 1.516 1.706
Loss from Fixed Prices for a 0.202 0.160 0.090 0.0400.0 10
One Percent Money Shockb
aDerived from equation (7), assuming (1-Qy/Q) =0.5.
b Numerical evaluations of equation (6), where (its- it) isdefined in equation (5).
34Table 3. Cycicality of Productivity
cx=0.45 ct=0.4 a=O.3 a=O.2 a=0.l
ImpliedMarkupRA 1.042 1.137 1.327 1.516 1.706
Percent Change in Productivity 0.0020.018 0.090 0.1960.326
for One Percent Output Changeb
a Derived from equation (7), assuming (1-OfiQ) =0.5.
b Numerical evaluations of equation (9).
35Table 4.PredictedBiases in Estimates of Markups and Returns to Scale
a=0.45 a=0.4 a=a3a=0.2 cz=0.1
1mpliedMarlcupp 1.042 1.137 1.327 1316 1.706
Percent Bias in Conventionally
EstimatedjsVAandyb 0.165 1.88 9.87 24.39 48.37
a Derivedfrom equation(7),assuming (1-Qj/Q)= 0.5.
bNjznevaluationsof equation(13).
36Table 5. Empirical Regularities
Explanatory Variables
PNP1 OVT1 AGH APu -APmj
Dependent
Variable




0.41 0.004 0.006 0.026





Standard errors in parentheses. Sample period is 1959-84.
Notes: M and Lj are industry materials and labor input; Pmj and Pb are the associated prices.
Y1 and Y are industry and manufacturing gross output PNP1, OVT. and AGH are, respectively,
the ratio of production to non-production workers, the average number of overtime hours
worked, and the number of hours worked by an average worker in each industry. All variables
are in logs.











Standard errors in parentheses. Sample period is 1959-84.
Notes: aY1VA and AY1G0 are growth rates of industry valueaddedand gross output. Ax'kis
the sum of the growth rates of industry capital and labor inputs, each weighted by its cost share in
the production of value added; AXVA is the analogue for aggregate manufacturing. ax°°is
the sum of the growth rates of industry capital, labor, energy and materials inputs, each weighted
by its cost share in the production of gross output; aXGO is the analogue for aggregate
manufacturing. ATFPIVA is the growth rate of industry total factor productivity calculated from
value added and capital and labor inputs: jpp1VA =yVA-ç1VA•ATFPIGO is the growt.h
rate of industry total factor productivity calculated from gross output and capital, labor, energy
and materials inputs: ATFPO = - ax100. AMand aLj are growth rates of industry
materials and labor input.
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